Books, Articles and Blog by Bryan Gould

Books, Articles and Blog by Bryan Gould

Economic Policies for an Incoming Labour Government – Part 3

Economic Policies for an Incoming Labour Government

By Bryan Gould and George Tait Edwards

 

Part 3 of 9 – The Different Uses of Credit Creation

 

Credit creation when properly deployed can serve five main purposes, each

having major and differential effects on the real economy. We cannot

expect, and nor can an incoming Labour government, to produce better

economic outcomes unless we understand the differences between them.

First, credit creation may be undertaken (and usually is) for purely

speculative purposes. Its principal purpose and effect is to fund housing

purchase and speculative financial transactions; it is often the main factor

in the development of housing, land and asset bubbles. It is this aspect of

credit creation that attracts most attention in today’s economy and which is

the main focus of the banks’ activities, since it is the easiest business to

attract, the most secure (since mortgages guarantee the value of the credit

in most cases) and the most profitable.

It is also the principal factor in stimulating inflation; housing values, in

particular, rise sharply as large volumes of credit-created money flow into

the housing market, and the consequent asset inflation is inevitably

followed by consumer led inflation as home-owners use the increased value

of their equity to increase consumption. This is, of course, of great

significance, given that the control of inflation is the prime and virtually

only focus of macro-economic policy; it suggests that the use of interest

rates to tighten monetary conditions, impacting as it does on the whole

economy, fails to address effectively and accurately the real cause of

inflationary pressures and is an unnecessarily broad and badly focused

instrument that does great damage to the wider economy at the same time.

The overwhelming dominance of credit creation for speculative purposes –

for both housing and other financial transactions – has other adverse

features. It distorts the desired operation of the economy by diverting

investment capital away from productive purposes, and by creating asset

bubbles in both residential housing and financial assets, not least in western

stock exchanges; and the resultant constant inflationary impetus then has

to be restrained by measures such as higher interest rates, so that the

chances of greater innovation and productivity are further prejudiced.

Despite all of these downsides, credit creation for speculative purposes as a

major economic factor impacting on the real economy is virtually ignored

by our policy-makers, except to the extent that it is seen as perfectly

normal and relatively benign.

The second kind of credit creation operates as an important element in

demand management. It is used to raise purchasing power by putting more

money in people’s pockets, and thereby can help to resolve the problem of

deficient demand that Keynes identified as the key element in the Great

Depression and that continues to characterise recessionary conditions today.

It would normally be undertaken by the banks, under direction from the

central bank or the Treasury, though it could also be undertaken directly by

the central bank or the government. It is little used in today’s Britain, not

surprisingly, when the Coalition government does not recognise a deficiency

of demand as the feature of a recessionary situation that needs correction.

It has, however, returned to favour as a counter-recessionary instrument in

the thinking of some of our leading monetary economists. Keynes had

suggested in the 1930s – half-jokingly but so as to make a serious point –

that a valuable counter-recessionary outcome could be obtained by burying

money in the ground and then paying firms to employ people to dig it up.

Their increased income would represent a significant increase in purchasing

power and therefore demand.

Such a policy today is often pejoratively characterised as “helicopter

money” – the notion that demand could be raised if pound notes were

scattered from the air – but has been seriously analysed by economists such

as Adair Turner and Michael Woodford who have reached the point of

debating whether it would best be delivered by fiscal measures (such as tax

cuts) or by monetary policy (essentially printing money).1

Credit creation undertaken to raise demand does not mean that it cannot

serve other purposes at the same time; or, to put it in another way, credit

creation undertake for other purposes, such as funding the purchase of

assets or providing capital for investment, may well also have the additional

effect of lifting the level of demand. As we shall see, the crucial question

is then as to whether the increased demand is merely inflationary or is

matched by increased output.

Thirdly, credit creation can also be undertaken for the purpose of stabilising

the financial system; this technique, which has been called Quantitative

Easing over recent times, has been implemented by governments in both

the UK and the US, and was meant to remedy – in the wake of the Global

Financial Crisis – the precarious situation of an otherwise bankrupt financial

system. In the case of the UK, the policy took the form of the Bank of

England’s £375bn of financial credit to stabilise the UK Clearing Banks but it

did nothing to benefit the wider economy. The greater proportion of that

sum was used by the banks to strengthen their balance sheets (and to

resume paying large bonuses); very little found its way into lending to the

Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises that desperately needed help in

maintaining adequate liquidity (and for plant and equipment investment).

Credit creation for the purpose of funding major innovative programmes –

sometimes called Government Credit Creation (GCC) – is the fourth kind of

credit creation and is designed to enable major innovative structural

economic change, such as the invention of the atomic bomb, the mass production

of synthetic rubber in the US in 1940-44, and President Obama’s

Energy Initiative; it is often resorted to in wartime. The intention is to

stimulate innovation in the public sector or infrastructure area of the

economy and to undertake large-scale projects that are vitally important to

the economy but are too large or not commercially rewarding enough to

attract private capital.

This kind of credit creation for public purpose is being supplanted

increasingly in Britain today by Public/Private Partnerships, on the specious

ground that they offer better value to the taxpayer; the reality is that they

are much more expensive than publicly funded projects, but they have the

great merit in the eyes of right-wing governments of offering fat profits to

their friends in private industry.

The fifth and, for our purposes, most interesting and important form of

credit creation is usually called Investment Credit Creation (ICC). This form

of credit is targeted at increasing investment in the plant and equipment

level in private industry, with the goal of encouraging productivity

improvement, accelerating the rate of economic growth and providing full

employment. Investment Credit Creation is usually delivered through the

local banks (if you have any) at the behest of the central bank and the

government. It is this aspect of credit creation that has been virtually

ignored in western economies over recent decades but which offers by far

the best prospect of breaking out of our seemingly irreversible economic

decline.

There is today virtually no understanding in Britain and other western

countries of how Investment Credit Creation functions and of the benefits it

can bring to economic development. The provision of credit – that is, bank

lending – is seen almost exclusively in terms of its capacity to stimulate

inflation and is seen therefore as a potential threat rather than as an

essential element in producing a better economic performance.

This is notwithstanding Keynes’ perceptive assertion that there is no reason

why the provision of credit for the purpose of productive investment should

not precede the increase in output that it is intended to produce, provided

that the increase occurs over an appropriate time frame. Other economies

have understood and benefited from this insight and have used Investment

Credit Creation to stimulate growth, without being inhibited by the

conviction that any increase in the money supply must necessarily be

inflationary.

There are, in fact, many persuasive instances from both recent history and

from other countries of the successful deployment of Investment Credit

Creation. One of the most striking examples of the use of credit creation,

not to inflate the property market for private profit as is done in the West

at present, but to stimulate rapid industrial growth, was provided by the

United States at the outbreak of the Second World War, when Roosevelt

used the two years before Pearl Harbour to provide virtually unlimited

capital to American industry – simply by printing money – so that the

country could rapidly increase its military capability.

Roosevelt encountered the usual objections from conventional economists

but the exigencies of war and his own political strength and will prevailed.

The results were spectacular and hugely significant. American industrial

output grew on average by an unprecedented 12.2% per annum from 1938

to 1944 – an outcome that went a long way towards enabling the US, and

the Allies more generally, to win the Second World War.

An equally impressive instance is provided by Japan in the 1960s and 1970s,

when Japanese industry was enabled by similar means to grow at a rapid

rate so as to dominate the world market for mass-produced manufactured

goods. Western economists have typically shown no interest in how this was

done and are almost totally ignorant of the work of leading growth expert

economists such as the Japanese Osamu Shimomura and the American-

Japanese Kenneth Kurihara. We shall look in more detail 2 later at exactly

how Investment Credit Creation was specifically implemented by the Bank

of Japan, at the behest of the government and following the advice of

Shimomura and his colleagues, and accordingly brought about the Japanese

economic miracle.

More recently, China has used similar techniques to finance the rapid

expansion of Chinese manufacturing. The Chinese central bank, and their

provincial counterparts, under instructions from the government, makes

credit available to Chinese enterprises that can demonstrate their ability to

comply with the government’s economic priorities. Enterprises that wish to

build or buy new capacity in compliance with the overall industrial strategy

are provided with the required investment capital, obtained through cost-free

credit creation; Chinese manufacturing capacity in particular has

largely been funded by such government-authorised new credit, as has the

huge purchasing programme of strategic assets from around the world that

is currently being undertaken by Chinese enterprises. This is admittedly, in

principle at least, easier to bring about in a totalitarian regime than in the

UK, but in practice there is nothing to stop a British government from

requiring the central bank, as the Chinese have done, to create cost-free

credit for specific (and productive) purposes.

Other Asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, have applied similar

policies in order to produce rapid industrial growth. Typically, however,

Western economists have arrogantly assumed that these successful

economies have nothing to teach us, and are easily dismissed as

undeveloped economies relying for competitive advantage on cheap labour;

the reality is, of course, that these economies are, as a consequence of the

rapid economic growth and industrial development made possible by

Investment Credit Creation, delivering incomes and living standards to their

populations that are approaching and in some cases surpassing those in the

West.

1 See www.voxeu.org/article/helicopter-money-policy-option

2   http://londonprogressivejournal.com/article/view/1565/the-key-relevance-of-the-writings-of-professor-kenneth-kenkichi-kurihara

© Bryan Gould and George Tait Edwards 2015

 

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