• Labour’s Failure

    Nothing more starkly demonstrates the parlous state of the Labour Party than the failure of its leaders (and almost all of its would-be leaders) to resist cuts in benefits that will drive many thousands of the most vulnerable into deeper poverty and despair.

    No one prepared to look at the evidence can doubt that the inevitable outcome of this further Tory attack on the notion of social responsibility will mean misery for many of those who have traditionally looked to Labour to fight their corner. Nothing could strike more directly at Labour’s raison d’etre over the whole of its history.

    I have watched in disbelief, from 12,000 miles away, as Labour leaders have sought to explain their unwillingness to stand firm and fight for what they supposedly believe. We are told that the voters’ support for further victimising those who have been left to pay the price of a recession for which they have no responsibility means that there is nothing further to be done.

    “We can’t fight the electorate” is the siren call. But how are the voters likely to view a Party that so manifestly lacks the courage of its convictions? Will they not conclude that Labour is fatally short of both courage and convictions?

    Opposition parties, even those that have recently lost elections, will usually have enough self-respect to stand up for what they believe in, even if the parliamentary arithmetic is against them. What Labour is doing shows that it no longer has a bottom line of any sort but will readily bend with whatever wind happens to blow.

    Even in the shortest of short-term electoral calculations, this waving of the white flag looks like bad politics. If the battlefield is to be abandoned so easily whenever the public are thought to have reached a view, the Tory advantage in resources and media support will always ensure that the fight for public support is over before it has begun. And the voters can be excused for concluding that, if even the party’s leaders cannot stick by their guns, there can be little in Labour’s position that deserves support, let alone warrants being fought for.

    What confidence can anyone, let alone the Party’s supporters, have in politicians who have so little stomach for the fight? Are we to be governed entirely by opinion polls? Are even the most fundamental of Labour values to be abandoned if “triangulation” does not support them? These failings could just about be tolerated by a party of the right, since their goal is simply the maintenance of power, but they are entirely destructive of any pretension from a Party of the left that professes to have an analysis and a programme that will produce a change for the better.

    In past and better days, the Labour Party willingly and bravely took on the task of changing and leading opinion. Campaigning for a better society was the Party’s life blood. Labour was “a crusade or it is nothing.” It was understood that the Party, as the proposer of change, had to do more than wait for public opinion to change of its own accord and could not afford just to trail along in its wake.

    Public opinion will move only if the voters see the Party standing up for what it believes in. That is true not only of specific issues but also of perceptions as to whether the Party is fit for government across the whole gamut of policy. The voters are likely to conclude that a Party without the confidence to fight its corner on a specific issue, especially one that has historically been important to it, will be even more handicapped and powerless when facing the multifarious problems of government.

    The Party’s stance on benefit cuts is, of course, even more worrying and comprehensive than it at first appears. It is of course a negative – a failure to say no to a change that it is expected to oppose. But it is more than that. It exposes a vacuum. The capitulation by Labour’s leaders is not only a misreading of the electoral runes but is a damaging revelation that the Party has literally nothing to say that is positive either.

    On virtually every policy issue, Labour has been reduced to saying “me too”. They may try to tack on a qualification – “not so much” or “not so fast” or “we’ll do it with a kindly smile”. But, in essence, Labour’s leaders evidently believe that they have nothing new to offer. They may carp and cavil at the outcomes of Tory policy, but they seem to have neither the competence not the capacity for hard work that are needed to come forward with real alternatives.

    The only way forward they see is accepting – even if only passively – yet more of the Tory agenda, which they are constantly advised, even by their friends, is the only option. Yet the world is changing fast. Long-held orthodoxy about macro-economic policy, about the role of the market, about Europe, about Britain’s role in the world, is being effectively challenged. Labour desperately needs a leadership that is no longer becalmed but that can ride that wave. The Party, and a large part of the electorate, cannot prosper without it.

     

    Bryan Gould

    21 July 2015

     

     

     

  • Do the Germans Realise the Damage They Have Done to Themselves and Europe?

    The Wehrmacht had a crack at it – but that attempt ended in disastrous failure 70 years ago. The long-held dream of German hegemony throughout Europe is, however, back on the agenda and closer than ever to realisation.

    The Greek crisis threw up many sub-plots – many of them of great significance of course to the Greeks themselves. But the real story of the Greek crisis is one of much wider import. It has stripped bare to the public gaze just where the pan-European project is really heading.

    What we have witnessed over recent months is a painful lesson being handed out to the Greeks – but even more importantly to the rest of Europe. Opinions may differ as to how responsible the Greeks may be for their own plight but what is now clear is that being part of “Europe” does not allow for any back-sliding if events move against you.

    So, the Greeks – having already being forced to accept over several years the most destructive of austerity packages – have not only been compelled to accept yet another instalment but have also been stripped of their powers of self-government and of democracy itself.

    The bail-out deal forced through the Greek parliament at the behest of European creditors makes absolutely no sense in economic terms. Even the IMF agrees that it makes it impossible for the Greeks to produce the resources needed just to service, let alone repay, their debts; and that is both totally unreasonable and lacking in reason, not only for the Greeks but for the creditors themselves.

    But it is the geo-political consequences that are most worthy of note. The Greeks have been treated with scarcely concealed contempt. They have been deliberately and ruthlessly humiliated. The wishes of the Greek people and of their elected government have been over-ridden by external forces who have no concern for their welfare.

    The Greeks have suffered this fate, not because they are uniquely culpable, but “pour encourager les autres”. The message has been deliberately designed for the rest of Europe. It is addressed to all those other small and medium-sized members of the euro zone who have suffered under the austerity regime forced upon them. The message is stark – there is no escape.

    Any country that might contemplate, as an alternative to euro-austerity, the reclamation of the powers of self-government and monetary sovereignty will be ruthlessly cut adrift. Even the Greeks, benighted as they are, could not brave that fate. The euro-zone is quite evidently a straitjacket, centrally applied and disciplined, whose rules over-ride democracy and the interests of ordinary people.

    And who or what, exactly, runs this arrangement from which there is no exit? It is German economic power. The troika of the IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission may look comfortingly like a European or even international authority, but the levers of power are actually moved by the German government.

    One of the most significant aspects of this unfolding landscape is the extent to which the Franco-German duumvirate, which we used to think actually called the shots, has been left in ruins. The Germans have felt no inhibition or compunction in letting it be seen that it is their view that must prevail. It is a measure of growing German confidence that they could quite publicly reject the preference of their erstwhile partners for a softer approach, and focus instead on giving overt priority to what they see as German interests.

    The mailed fist is now clearly visible. Any country in the euro zone that steps out of line will find itself forced back, with its own government and parliament sidelined and left impotent. There can be no debate. There can be no alternative to austerity; neo-classical economic policy and continued stagnation at best is, by decree of the German government, the only option.

    The German goal is to establish German hegemony across the whole European economy by ensuring that the policies framed in Berlin are adopted and applied across the continent. They have not found it necessary to fire a shot. But the way forward is not without its risks and casualties.

    Any misapprehension about how Germany sees its role in the new Europe has now been dispelled. German ambitions will henceforth be looked at much less tolerantly, and will meet increasingly strong headwinds. Angela Merkel’s confidence that she no longer needs to dissemble about those ambitions will certainly be put to the test.

    More importantly, the European ideal has been seriously compromised. A Europe revealed as simply a vehicle for German power is a very different entity from the force for peace and unity which has been sold to us so far.

    Europe over many centuries has faced the problem of restraining whichever was the dominant power of the time. They have usually succeeded, one way or another. That is unlikely to change. The Greeks will not be the only ones to pay a price for their bail-out. Europe’s future, too, is now more clouded and uncertain.

    Bryan Gould

    17 July 2015

     

  • Chinese Buyers? No, Australian Banks

    The outrage, justified or otherwise, at Labour’s disclosures about Chinese buyers in the Auckland property market have distracted the critics from the main point being made. In any market, whether for property or anything else, the introduction of a major new element of demand will have an immediate impact and will drive prices upwards. And that is true, whether the new entrants are from New Zealand, outer space or elsewhere. It is not the provenance of the new buyers that matters but the fact of the increased demand.

    No one disputes that overseas buyers, many from China, are now actively involved in buying Auckland property.  In the case of these buyers, their impact is increased by the fact that they are not only a new element but in many cases have greater purchasing power than local buyers, and can therefore outbid them. And because their purchases will often be made for speculative purposes, they will be more concerned with the prospective return on their investment rather than with its immediate resale value or the property’s suitability as accommodation for themselves. These factors, taken together, have pushed up prices and help to explain why Auckland’s housing crisis is one of affordability as well as of an imbalance between supply and demand

    There is, however, a further issue that is almost completely overlooked. It is not just overseas buyers, Chinese or otherwise, whose purchasing power is helping to drive prices up. That factor is significant for local buyers as well. In both cases, the fact that purchasers are willing and able to enter the market and to pay the inflated prices for Auckland property is a major factor in determining the price structure in that market.

    In the case of local buyers, their willingness and ability to pay the ever-increasing prices is a reflection of several factors. If they are already home-owners in Auckland, they will be able to use the inflated sale price of their existing property to finance – at least in part – the purchase of a new one. They will also have the assurance, for the time being at least, that the rise and rise in Auckland house prices and the consequently increased equity they enjoy will relieve them of any concern about the size of the debt they have to take on.

    Most importantly, their purchasing power reflects their ability to access relatively cheap mortgage finance from banks that are always keen to lend. They are therefore able to go into the market armed with a purchasing power that is hugely greater than they can command for any other purpose. There is no other market where it is not only possible but commonplace to draw on a purchasing power of up to three times one’s annual income, to pay a low interest rate on such borrowing, and to enjoy what seems to be a cast-iron guarantee that the asset purchased will provide not only huge utility (in the form of accommodation) but a substantial capital gain as well.

    None of this would be possible if it were not for the continued willingness of the banks to lend for house purchase. For the banks it is a no-brainer. As the Bank of England has now confirmed, banks create the money they lend out of nothing and can charge interest on the new money for as long as it exists in the form of a debt owed to them. That is where their record and increasing profits come from. It requires little effort to attract mortgage business (since there is never a shortage of potential borrowers) and it is a more low-cost, secure and relatively risk-free business than any other form of lending.

    There is virtually no constraint on the volumes of new money that the banks are able to create and lend in this way. The only limitation is the availability of new borrowers with enough security and ability to service the loan – and even those constraints are eased by the asset inflation that ever-increasing lending brings about. The banks are able in other words to go on lending ever-increasing amounts into an inflating market which they themselves create.

    Much of this is unfamiliar to the banks’ customers who continue to believe that the banks lend only money that is actually deposited with them by savers. But the truth of the situation – that what the banks lend has virtually nothing to do with the much smaller volume of deposits they receive – is beginning to dawn on the authorities and, in particular, on the Reserve Bank, which is why there is increasing interest in so-called macro-prudential measures designed to restrain bank lending on mortgage.

    That is also why, as Professor Laurence Murphy of Auckland University points out, freeing up more land for development will do little to help. It will simply provide yet more opportunities for banks to lend larger and larger sums of newly created money and for developers to seek larger and larger profits. The affordability crisis will go on getting worse. In other words, and at the risk of accusations of xenophobia, it is not so much Chinese buyers, as Australian-owned banks, that are responsible for our housing crisis.

    Bryan Gould

    16 July 2015

     

     

  • Reforms? I Don’t Think So.

    As the Greek crisis unfolds, we are constantly informed by the world’s media that the European power-brokers will agree to a further bail-out only if Greece implements a programme of “reforms”. Most people will see this as confirming their understanding of what the crisis is about. The Greeks, it seems, have mismanaged their economy; so what could be more sensible and reasonable than to insist, as a condition of any further help provided to them, that they should improve their economic management? And, if they refuse to “reform”, surely they have no one to blame but themselves?

    The constant use of the term “reforms”, however – no doubt seen by the media as a neutral and objectively accurate term – is nevertheless grossly misleading. It reflects a view of the crisis that is very much that taken by the Germans and their client states, but is a long way removed from what is really at issue. It has become a real obstacle to a clear view of the causes of the crisis and of the only realistic way forward.

    When the Global Financial Crisis (for which the Greeks had little or no responsibility) exposed the frailty of the Greek economy, and the level of indebtedness that they had been allowed and encouraged to take on as the price of living with the euro, Greece found that they were unable to repay their creditors. Those creditors agreed to bail them out, but on condition that they put in place a programme of “reforms”. The Greeks had little option but to agree.

    Some of the “reforms” were long overdue, and addressed some of the obvious failings – the inefficiencies, the slackness, the unduly generous social provision, the tax evasion – that had characterised Greek economic management. But many others were designed to impose on Greece the kind of austerity measures that the euro zone leaders had insisted on as a response to recession and which – it is now clear – have condemned the European economy as a whole to a prolonged stagnation.

    Those measures had a particularly direct and damaging effect on the Greek economy. Public spending was cut, pensions and other benefits reduced, tight monetary policy introduced, bank lending fell. As many warned at the time, it was hard to see how a weak and uncompetitive economy that had run up large debts and that was now required to take on the burden of repaying them could hope to do so if they were at the same time obliged to adopt policies that ensured that the economy got smaller.

    And so it has proved. The entirely predictable outcome of the “reforms” made by the Greeks has been that their economy is now 25% smaller than it was and unemployment has soared. Their ability to service and repay their debts is much reduced. But none of that seems to worry their taskmasters; they insist on yet another round of further “reforms” as the price of extending the bail-out.

    The extraordinary aspect of this is that the course insisted upon by the creditors is not even in their own interests. The “reforms” they demand can only reduce still further the Greeks’ ability to repay what they owe. With the best will in the world, the Greeks will find that – after a few more years of “reforms” – they are yet deeper in the mire.

    So what is really in play here? The answer lies in ideology. There are, after all, many precedents in recent times for what the Canadian writer, Naomi Klein, in her influential book The Shock Doctrine, has described as “disaster capitalism”. Countries faced with natural disasters or political paralysis or economic collapse, and that need as a result to ask the IMF or some other agency for help, have all too often been required to put in place what are usually called “structural reforms” as the price of that help.

    So, countries like Chile, recovering from the turmoil of the Pinochet dictatorship, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Poland, and Russia, have all found themselves obliged to implement policies of privatisation, deregulation and savagely reduced public spending in order to qualify for help. In each case, the results have been the same – economies where inequality widens rapidly, the fat cats make large fortunes overnight and ordinary people suffer poverty and unemployment.

    It is not just economies facing specific crises that have fallen victim to “disaster capitalism”. When the Japanese economy stagnated in the 1990s after several decades of rapid growth, the remedy prescribed by western experts was “structural reform”. But, as Professor Richard Werner of Southampton University and a former Shimomuran Fellow with the Bank of Japan has demonstrated, the nostrums so dear to the hearts of neo-classical economists failed over more than two decades to solve the problems but instead entrenched them. They have now been abandoned by Shinzo Abe’s government.

    What we are witnessing in Europe is, in other words, a triumph of ideology over common sense and constantly repeated experience. As always, the price for these mistakes is paid by ordinary people. Reforms? I don’t think so.

    Bryan Gould

    13 July 2015

     

  • It’s Up to Europe’s Leaders Now

    Like so many others, I long ago got used to being pilloried as “anti-European” for daring to say that the “Europe” we were urged to sign up to was no such thing, but was a particular arrangement cooked up by the powerful and foisted on the people of that often benighted continent without bothering either to consult them or to take count of their wishes.

    As the Greek crisis unfolds, and as it strips bare the pretensions of those powerful forces who talk with less and less conviction of the European ideal and of democratic rights, we can surely no longer be in any doubt. The “Europe” in whose service so much sacrifice is now demanded is a cartel of bankers, financiers and right-wing politicians who have no interest in democracy, or jobs, or the living standards of ordinary people. As the Greek people suffer, and plead “no more”, it is not the travails of the Greeks – or, for that matter, the Spanish, or the Portuguese, or the Italians – that weigh with Europe’s powerful; their sights are fixed on maintaining austerity and discipline, on adhering to ideology and doctrine.

    Above all, they are determined to protect the euro, because it is the one weapon that ensures that there can be no backsliding. The euro was put in place so that, whatever temptations – or even imperatives – there may be, there can be no going back. The grim and unrelenting disciplines of neo-classical economics demand nothing less.

    For many of us, this imposition of a single monetary policy and discipline on a hugely diverse European economy was always destined to fail. There was no way that small and underdeveloped economies like Greece could survive competition from a powerful German economy, especially when it was the Germans who had the power to decide on the monetary policy that should be put in place – and no prizes for guessing whose interests that policy turned out to serve.

    The irony is that is those powerful interests – represented by the IMF, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission and obliged to follow the dictates of the German Finance Minister – who now find that, despite the disparity in power between them and a bankrupt and demoralised Greece, it is they – and not the supposedly feckless Greeks – who have the responsibility for saving the euro.

    With the power of the referendum result behind him, Prime Minister Tsipras can now say that there is nothing more he can do. Ravaged by austerity, Greece has no resources left. Unless they are helped by a bail-out package that does not drive them deeper into collapse but instead gives them a chance, over time, to begin to grow again, they will be forced – since there is no other option – to leave the euro and seek their own salvation.

    The Greeks have, in other words, taken their decision. There is nothing left for them to decide. The ball is now in the court of Europe’s leaders. It is nor fort them to give up entrenched positions. It is up to them to decide whether to refuse to help, with the result that Greece will have to leave the euro whether they like it or not, simply to survive, or to relent and offer a more acceptable and realistic package that will keep Greece afloat and allow them to stay in a re-shaped common currency.

    We know what they want to do. They have stuck to the current stance in the hope that the Greek government will fall and “regime change” will be brought about. There has even been talk of a government imposed on the Greek people from outside or of a government of “technocrats” that will do the bidding of the financial establishment. The referendum result, though, seems to have put paid, for the time being at least, to that disgraceful objective.

    But, for a brief period, the Greek crisis has given us a glimpse of the mailed fist and doctrinaire rigidity behind the “European” ideal. Rarely can there have been such a stark demonstration of the inherently undemocratic nature of the European power structure and of the interests it truly serves.

    It may be that the Greeks, by forcing an “agonising re-appraisal”, will end up having done the true adherents of a united Europe a favour. It may be that, at long last, we will begin to contemplate a Europe based on agreement freely given by the continent’s governments and peoples, an agreement to build a Europe by learning from each other how to work together and to cooperate more closely, a functional Europe that will do those things that are best done together rather than separately, a “bottom-up” Europe that will develop as a result of, but not getting ahead of, a growing sense of European identity and the wishes of its peoples.

    We need a Europe, in other words, that is not just a vehicle for advancing powerful interests, and riding roughshod over everyone else, but that understands that the Greek poor and unemployed are just as important, and just as essential, to Europe’s future, and that enabling them and millions like them to live a better life is both a united Europe’s true purpose and its only real chance of success.

    Bryan Gould

    6 July 2015.